Report on the Tame accident in Cuenca

Notó 1 añor and 3 months since Tame's accident in the capital of Azuay to finally, at least preliminary and partially, see the report on the Tame accident in Cuenca, although for now we only have informationón about the probable causes that generated this event.

Final report

Background

It was a día 28 of April 2016 when flight EQ-173 operated on an aircraftón Embraer 190 foodíHC-COX, núserial grouper 19000372 and with añor manufacturingón 2010, began its approach procedureón to the city of Cuenca from Quito. It's about 07:50 the Cuenca control tower authorized the landing of this flight under limited weather conditions on the runway 23 (north to south).

The METAR of that dayíIn Cuenca it showed light rain on the stationón and reduced visibility of 8 kilómeters, although hours before the rain hadía sido máis intense. Before Tame's landing, some 20 minutes before, a LATAM Airlines Ecuador flight operated on an Airbus A319 habíhas landed without apparent problems or at least that have been done públicos.

At 07:51 the grandfatherón runs into wheels on a contaminated track and that on several occasions thereíhas had a report of «skated» or reduced or poor braking efficiency over several flights, aerolílines and type of aircraft, despite the fact that recentlyíhas been intervened with a job runway rejuvenation  that takes placeó between 6 February and Monday 8 of that same month in 2016.

after running into wheels, the grandfatherón travels the track normally, initiating braking procedures on the complex and short Cuenca track, what happens nextés, we all know.

the grandfatherón Embraer 190 stops in the safety zone after having performed a maneuver where the aircraft turns in 180 degrees leaving his nose in the opposite direction to the one he landedó, and the report was partially known onlyén the día sánot yet 29 July 2017.

Report on the Tame accident in Cuenca

Now we are going to review point by point the possible causes that generated the accident according toún the JIA report – Accident Investigation Board and try to explain it in términos más simple so that everyone understands it, así do not have any knowledge of Aviación:

Report on probable causes of the Tame accident #Embraer190 on #Cuenca in April of 2016. Complete document pending ✈️ pic.twitter.com/DcZh9cp7Jw

— Nicolás Larenas ✈️ (@n_larenas) July 29, 2017

Probable Causes

• The conditions of the Cuenca airport runway at the time of the plane's landingón of TAME was contaminated with water and slippery.

One point crítico and it is known in the industry that the Cuenca Airport runway hasíto very poor braking conditions in rainy conditions, the water accumulated and generated «skated» to the planes landing. Although there are no official reports that have been made púwarlike about it, several pilots were able to tell me what they feltíthese conditions on several types of airplanes that fly to Cuenca. For this same reason, afterés of the February runway rejuvenation and the accident, The track was intervened again to change its layer soálithic and improve drainage, which caused significant accumulationóno water on the track.

• The landing was madeó after an approximationón not stabilized and with a tailwind.

An approximationón not stabilized is when the aircraftón could not «line» at the same timeánormal meters indicated on approach procedure chartsón, This may be due to a higher speed or, for example, a delay.íor start of decline and that implies a greater decline than the -1000 feet per minute.

An approximationóunstabilized is that configurationón unwanted aircraft that subjects éshe and her crewón to one takenón unnecessary during one of the phases más críflight ethics, reducing the

time available to complete checklists and prepare for landing, and which may incur a safety risk if not identified and controlled by the crew.ón. Source Flap152.

• The non-applicationón of the Maximum Performance Landing procedure recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landing on contaminated runways.

There are endless callsémash, types of landings or configurations, where the pilots, themselvesún the length of the track, if this isá wet, dry or even if it has another type of material like snow on it, to set upán the flaps and autobrakes to achieve braking in the space available on the runway. Sayúat this point, The pilots should have applied a better configurationóbraking no., under known conditions. in a personal way,

Contributing Factors

• The flight conditions with 1.500 kg más of fuel about the amount with which this flight was usually carried out.

It indicates that the grandfatherón was flying with a load greater than normal for that route, but it is not indicated whether on that occasion there was an increaseó the fuel due to possible contingencies such asón of fourówaiting or approachingón due to the bad weather that was knowníat the time of dispatching the flight.

• I left itón of cácalculation of the length of the runway necessary to make the landing using the informationóbraking efficiency n.

A series of factors could have generated the omissionón of is cáIllusion by the crewón due to work overload due to the above factors that the report details.

• I decided itón of the crewón to make the approachón end with three red lights and one white, using the PAPI system, induced by informationón of the Terminal Information document issued by TAME that authorizes this procedure.

As indicated, it is an authorized procedure, but above all, normal in Tame. The PAPI lights are a system that indicates to pilots if their approachón isá very high, medium high, perfect, medium low or very low. With 3 red lights the system isá indicating that the avión isá medium low with respect to the recommended glide slope for that airport, but is normal. Normal to Cuenca have a short runway, Aerol proceduresídirections recommend hitting the track as much as possibleás sooner better, to theí have a larger runway surface to slow down the aircraftón.

• I use itóno. of terminologyía confusing in the Terminal Information document, that you usedéterms applicable to the Airbus fleet, instead of Embaer's.

This point, although it is the entire responsibility of the airlineínea, It can be assumed that the entire crewón Embraer was correctly instructed in this regard to differentiate the different terminologyías y téterms applicable to your respective aircraftón.

• I decided itón of the crewónot to carry out the approach maneuverón frustrated after she went too faró the mámaximum allowable vertical speed and that visibility was apparently limited after they passed the minimumíyou.

An approximationóA frustrated flight is the pilots' main resource for situations of lack of runway visibility., algúno problem with the avión, runway interference, approximationón not stabilized or any situationón that could generate a risk for the flight. It is assumed that this informationóJIA's report is based on black box recordings, but if that's the case, the crewón debió having made the approachón frustrated and try to land again under better conditions at the indicated points. The Míminimums are a height indicated on the approach chartón and are the point críattic where the crewón make the decisionón landing or rising again.

• I use itóIncorrect use of aircraft braking aids, in this case the reversals.

There's not much to explain, airplanes have their engines in f modeáeasy to explain, two powers, one forward to take off and fly and the other reverse to brake, which to redirect a percentage of the thrust flow vectorially down and forward. The report does not indicate in whaté point the reversals were not applied,  ¿they were not activated, were partially activated?

• The applicationón of the emergency brake that inhibits the antiskid system

The anti-skid system can be compared to the ABS system of cars, which helps to equalize the speed of rotationón of all wheels, this system is help to precisely avoid track departures.

• Lack of applicationón adequate management of crew resourcesón, particularly inside the cockpit.

This is part of what is known as CRM (GuestóNo. of Cabin Resources), in which in téIn general terms, the responsibilities of each crew member are better managed during the flight and even on the ground at administrative and managerial levels.. The CRM was bornó after serious accidentséprisoners between the 70s and early 90s and seeks to reduce accidents due to human errors by pilots mainly.

• Lack of training in the use of c tablesáCalculation of track distances.

Surely the pilots who read this point will find it difficultá understand that a crewón with experience lacks training in the use of these tables. The important thing hereí and what remains to be read is the rest of the report is to knowáhe was the cápilots calculation, to determine theí what failedó.

Concludedón

This is what the first information saysón of the report to beían 258 págassed. We will have to wait to have the complete document to be able to read moreás in detail what generatedó the accident and the transcriptón of voice and data recorders (black boxes), since these probable causes and in a personal way, Eastán focused on a 96% in the responsibility of the pilots and the subject of the track left to a single point, since it is knownía of its problems and that led to a second recovery in the period of just 3 months and if the influence of the track will notíhas been so important, there will not beíhas done the second job.

of what is known, the grandfatherón dutyá be dismantled after insurance report, where your repairóto beíto possible, but with a high cost to Cuenca not having any hangar and less prepared to carry out the required work than beingístill deep and require a workshop and certified personnel, without knowing the potentialñor or not in the fuselage of the planeón. Another alternative that will beíto shuffled, was to fly the planeón ferry to Guayaquil to carry out repair workón ahí, since the avión, supervision bajoómanufacturer's number, couldíto have made this flight at low altitude and not pressurized.