Final accident report between firefighters and Airbus A320neo in Lima

It was made púthe war final accident report aroused among the firefighters of the Lima airport and a Airbus A320neo from LATAM Perú.

To begin with, it is important to indicate that in accordance with the provisions of the Annex 13 to the Convention on Aviationón Civil International, “The úsole objective of the researchónumber of accidents or incidents, to beá
la preventionón of future accidents and incidents”.

Operational Safety Recommendations, resulting from the process téresearch scientistón, they don't have the propósite of generating presumptionón of guilt or responsibility.

Final LATAM Airbus A320neo accident report – firemen

La informationóní exposed is the same as the final report published by the authority of Peruú.

Last 18 November 2022, I saw oneón Airbus A320-200, foodícula CC-BHB, operated by the companyñía LATAM Perú, sufferó a damn aéreo while it is detached from Lima, Perú on runway 16L towards Juliaca as flight LPE2213.

After the aircraft have moved 1,200 mts. ca.. and with 243 Km/hr o 131 knots, collides with the vehicleíRescue R3's ass that enteredó to the Flight Track when moving ráask from the new StationóAeron Firefighters No.áuticos, in the executionón of an ETR.

Product of the strong impact, the engine on the right side of the aircraft came offó of its embedment, the right main gear collapsed and the aircraft slidó on the runway on its right wing, the fuel spilledó and it became inflamedó; así same, the vehíRescue R3's ass was leftó destroyed.

The crewón téconical executedó interruption proceduresótakeoff and control the directionón of the aircraft until it stopsón; the crewóCabin attendant conducted immediate evacuationónumber of passengers and crew, after SSEI-LAP Rescue carried out the extinctionón of the fire. Due, two died (02) of three (03) Aeron Firefightersáuticos that crewed the VehicleíAss Rescue R3, leaving the third firefighter seriously injured.

The final report of the investigationón, published on 29 September 2023 determinó as Cause of the accident; “Colisión of the LATAM Aircraft during the takeoff run, against a vehicleíSSEI-LAP Rescue ass, what incursionó on the track of flight without having the Authorizationón CORPAC Control Tower Express, when performing a Response Time Taking Exercise from the new StationóAeron Firefighters No.áuticos of the Jorge Chá International Airportáturn. This chain of events originatedó due to the lack of joint planning; one coordinate usón poor; and the non-use of communicationón and phraseologyía standardized by ICAO.

The investigationóI don't identifyó the following factors contributing to the accident:

1. Not having held a meetingón de Briefing posterior al 1er ETR entre LAP/SSEILAP y CORPAC, to determine errors, deficiencies, discrepancies and material and procedural shortages in the development of the exercise, that would have allowed the analysis and provision of improvement actions in all the aspects found, as a basis for óI executed the bestón of the 2nd ETR.
2. The acceptanceón no observations from CORPAC to the LAP proposal, to perform ETR from partially implemented and testing facilities, located in the new áairport areas, that toún no habíhave been officially handed over to the control of CORPAC.
3. No meetings have been held between the LAP SMS and CORPAC for the identificationón of the dangers, guestsón of risks and mitigation actionsón, inherent to programmingón and executionón of ETR from the new áairport areas and facilities.
4. Not having held a meetingójoint meeting between LAP and CORPAC to plan the executionón of the 2nd ETR, that would have allowed the participating personnel to know more clearly the concept and details of it.
5. The instruction has not been carried outón appropriate to the SSEI-LAP and Tower Controllers personnel, for familiarizationón of the locationón, designationón and operational operation of the new Aircraft Taxiways and VíVehicles.
6. The incorrect applicationón of the principles of communicationón berriesáutica (clarity and precisionón) among those involved in the coordinationón prior executionón of the 2nd ETR, generó an interpretationóCORPAC Tower Controllers' mistaken opinion about their executionón.
7. The Tower Controllers did not notice that, by authorizing the withdrawal of the Safety Cones from the SSEI-LAP, was being released única vía (VSR4) for the direct entry of the Veh convoyíRescue asses to the flight strip.
8. The wrong interpretationón that SSEI-LAP Rescue had, when I think I confirm itón that the Tower gave him for the start of the 2nd ETR, spaghettién implicaba la authorizationóentry number to the flight runway.
9. Air ControllersóDrome and Tower Surface, They knew about the 2nd ETR, minutes before his executionón, the situationón that does not allow themó have the ability to analyze risks and appropriately prioritize managementón of the tránsito aéreo.
10. Phraseology not having been used properlyístandard established by ICAO for communications and collations between the SSEI-LAP and the Tower Controller during the executionón of the 2nd ETR.

On the air sideínea, No findings were found that contributed to the accident., to his crewón have been up to dateíwith all legal requirements and have complied with all parámetros para la operationón safe.

The full report composed of 162 páginas is available on the CIAA website.